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Abstract 
  The shocks that underlie China’s comparatively rapid growth include gains in 
productivity, factor accumulation and policy reforms that increase allocative efficiency.  The 
well-known Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis links productivity growth in tradable industries with 
real appreciations.  Yet it relies heavily on the law of one price applying for tradable goods, 
against which there is now considerable evidence.  In its absence, other growth shocks also affect 
the real exchange rate by influencing relative supply or demand for home product varieties.  This 
paper investigates the pre-conditions for the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis to predict a real 
appreciation in the Chinese case.  It then quantifies the links between all growth shocks and the 
Chinese real exchange rate using a dynamic model of the global economy with open capital 
accounts and full demographic underpinnings to labour supply.  The results suggest that financial 
capital inflows most affect the real exchange rate in the short term, while differential productivity 
is strong in the medium term.  Contrary to expectation, in the long term demographic forces 
prove to be weak relative to changes in the skill composition of the labour force which enhance 




The trend of China’s underlying real exchange rate is of critical importance to Chinese 
macroeconomic policy and to the global capital market.  Numerous studies suggesting nominal 
undervaluation, combined with international political pressure to revalue the Renminbi (RMB), 
imply that future nominal appreciations are expected.
1  If it is also expected that the Peoples Bank 
of China will give future priority to domestic price stability, an underlying real appreciation is 
implied.  Yet real growth is associated with technical advances and factor accumulation and, in 
general, both of these tend to reduce costs relative to those in less rapidly expanding trading 
partners.  The story is more complex when tradability varies across a country’s goods and 
services and technical change is slower in the non-traded sectors.  Then comparatively rapid 
growth has a Balassa (1964) - Samuelson (1964) dimension whereby international trade 
maintains tradable price parity and faster tradable productivity growth pushes up relative wages, 
necessitating in turn that non-tradable prices rise and hence the real exchange rate appreciates.
2
Yet overall GDP growth stems not only from tradable productivity improvements.  For 
one thing, at some stages of development productivity has been found to grow more quickly in 
                                                 
1 The claim that the RMB is mercantilistically undervalued occurs frequently in the scholarly literature, as in Dooley 
et al. (2004), Frankel (2004), Tung and Baker (2004), Cline (2005), Coudert and Couharde (2005), Aizenman and 
Lee (2006) and Lardy (2006), and in more partisan political fora, as in Bernanke (2006) and Callan (2007). 
2 See Balassa (1964) and, more peripherally, Samuelson (1964). 
  2non-traded services.
3  Even where there is clear evidence of relatively rapid tradable productivity 
growth, other growth shocks affect real exchange rates if there is failure of a key assumption of 
the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis (BSH), namely the law of one price for tradable goods.  Yet 
there is now abundant evidence of the failure of this law in other contexts and comparatively 
serious infrastructural constraints in developing countries suggest “wider borders” there.
4  As 
soon as this failure is conceded, factor endowment changes and demand switching via the saving 
rate or trade policy come into play.  And China’s recent economic history is riddled with rapid 
changes in its labour force, capital stock, saving rate and trade policy. 
This paper explores these interactions for the case of China in a dynamic numerical model 
of the global economy that embodies full demographic behaviour.  To identify conditions under 
which the Chinese real exchange rate will appreciate, changes to population policy, skill-
acquisition rates, saving rates, financial reform and factor productivity growth are introduced, the 
latter differentially across the agricultural, industrial and services sectors.  While the modelling 
confirms the BSH corollary that productivity growth in the tradable sectors alone leads to real 
appreciation, many of the growth-related shocks considered are shown to place downward 
pressure on the real exchange rate in the long run.  The section to follow briefly reviews the BSH 
and the international evidence in support of it.  Section 3 then examines the Chinese evidence, 
presenting a new analysis of sectoral productivity performances in China.  Section 4 offers a 
generalisation of the BSH, leading to Section 5, which describes the more general global model 
used.  Section 6 then describes the use of the model to construct time paths of elasticities of 
China’s real exchange rate to alternative growth shocks.  Conclusions are offered in Section 7. 
 
2 The Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis and its Fragility 
  If the nominal exchange rate, E, is defined as the number of units of foreign exchange 
obtained for a unit of the domestic currency, then the real exchange rate,  , can be defined 
correspondingly as the rate of exchange between the home product bundle and corresponding 
bundles produced abroad.  It follows that the bilateral real exchange rate for a focus (home) 
country with foreign trading partner i can be approximated as the common currency ratio of the 
gross domestic product (GDP) prices (deflators) of the two countries, 
R e
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3 See Miyajima (2005). 
4 See, for example, Engel (1993), Engel and Rogers (1996) and Bergin et al. (2006). 
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This is the fundamental relationship between the real and nominal exchange rates.  Consider the 
case in which prices at home and abroad are measured relative to a common global numeraire, 
the share of non-traded products in GDP, θ, is the same at home and abroad, prices are 
aggregated using a Cobb-Douglas index and the law of one price applies to all traded goods.  The 
latter implies that trade is costless and undistorted, so that 
T
i pp
T = . Under these conditions, the 
real exchange rate becomes 



















From this, the key role of non-traded goods prices is clear.  When prices are measured in a 
common currency, or relative to a common international numeraire, it is the ratio of the home and 
foreign non-traded goods prices that matters in determining the real exchange rate. 
  To illustrate the associated dependence on productivity, imagine that labour is the single 
fixed factor and that the rates of output per worker in the home traded and non-traded sectors are 
T A  and 
N A .  In trading partner i, the corresponding rates are
T
i A  and 
N
i A .  The relationships 
between the wage rate and product prices in the traded and non-traded sectors follow from 
equating the wage in both sectors with the values of the marginal products of labour in each: 
, from which it follows that the divergence in wage rates 
between trading partners depends only on their tradable productivities: 
,
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  Under the assumptions of the BSH, then, an economy that is growing faster than its 
trading partners also has faster tradable productivity growth ( ˆˆ T
i
T A A > ),faster wage growth 
( ),relative service price inflation ( ˆ
i WW > ˆ ˆˆ
N N
i pp > ), and an appreciating real exchange rate 
                                                 
5  Here we imagine that, rather than the continuum of tradability that is observed across goods and services, traded 
and non-traded goods are separated starkly as T, N. 
  4( ).  The hypothesis then implies that, if developing countries are poorer because their 
tradable labour productivity is lower, then their comparatively rapid growth should be associated 
with real appreciations against their richer trading partners. 
ˆ 0
R e >
The empirical evidence from searches for dominant BSH effects in rapidly growing 
developing countries is mixed.  Choudhri and Khan (2004), for example, find favourable 
evidence using a small sample of developing countries that does not include mainland China, 
Taiwan or Hong Kong.  Bergin et al. (2006) find a positive association between price levels and 
real per capita income that is strong only in large samples of countries.  Miyajima (2005) uses a 
sample of 15 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries 
between 1970 and 2000 to establish that the hypothesis does not always hold during growth 
surges, which on numerous occasions were led by productivity growth in non-traded sectors.  The 
East and Southeast Asian evidence since 1980 is also mixed.  Only Japan showed a rapid real 
appreciation following the demise of the Bretton Woods system in 1972 and in association with 
its correspondingly rapid export-led growth.
6  As Figure 1 shows the same pattern is not observed 
for Korea, Taiwan or for any of the larger Southeast Asian economies.  Thus, in East and 
Southeast Asia at least, where comparatively high rates of GDP growth riding on manufacturing 
exports would suggest high tradable productivity growth, the BSH effect appears frequently to be 
more than offset by other forces. 
The China-focussed literature on the BSH is mainly in Chinese and it is dominated by the 
work of Lu Feng at the China Center for Economic Research, Peking University.
7  In his most 
comprehensive study, Lu (2006a) estimates labour productivity in China’s manufacturing and 
service sectors between 1978 and 2004.  He describes the evolution of China’s manufacturing 
labour productivity after 1978 as a two-stage process: during the first stage (1978-1990) it was 
only 1.9% per year, compared with a per capita GDP growth rate of 7.5%; while during the 
second stage (1991-2004) it increased dramatically, averaging 13.1%, significantly higher than 
the official per capita GDP growth rate of 8.2%.  Labour productivity in the (largely non-traded) 
service sector averaged 4.3% per year over the entire period.  He divides manufacturing by 
service labour productivity to get yearly estimates of Chinese relative tradable to non-tradable 
labour productivity.  Assuming a value of 100 in 1978, this reveals that relative tradable to non-
tradable productivity dropped to 84 in 1990 but rose rapidly thereafter, reaching 276 in 2004.  He 
then calculates corresponding ratios for the US and 13 OECD economies over the same period, 
                                                 
6 Japan is a special case in the East and Southeast Asian experience.  It was the first to develop rapidly but its 
economy, and particularly its services sector, remained far more closed than for its neighbours, and particularly 
relative to China. 
7 See Lu (2006a, 2006b, 2007) and Lu and Han (2006). 
  5and uses these to construct “relative-relative” labour productivity indices for China in terms of 
the US and the OECD.  The results show the same trend, with China’s relative tradable to non-
tradable productivity dropping compared with its trading partners between 1978 and 1991 and 
increasing strongly between 1994 and 2004. 
Lu asserts that this pattern is demonstrative of the RMB’s early overvaluation and 
subsequent undervaluation.  In particular, he takes the view that the rapid growth of Chinese 
relative manufacturing productivity since 1994 suggests a trend of real exchange rate appreciation 
in this period.  The fact that this pattern is not borne out in the Chinese real exchange rate series 
of Figure 1 appears to confirm that the tendency for relative tradable productivity to cause real 
appreciation has been more than offset by other forces.  Yet productivity measurement is beset by 
numerous difficulties, including the undercounting of industrial employment in China due to the 
influx of unregistered rural workers to urban areas, inadequate volume measures for services and 
the lack of quality or composition adjustments to estimates of the capital stock.
8  To clarify our 
own perspective, re-examine the data for China since 1986 using a multi-sectoral and multi-factor 
approach. 
 
3  Sectoral Productivity in China 
We estimate simple Solow residuals for the economy as a whole and for three sectors: 
“Agriculture”, “Industry” and “Services”.
9  Assuming Hicks neutral technological progress and 
constant returns Cobb-Douglas technology, the annual Solow residual takes the form: 








where Y is output,   is physical capital and L is labour (unskilled and skilled).   K α is the 
elasticity of output to the capital stock and the capital share of value added.  We apply this 
relationship to annual data from 1985 to 2005 for the economy as a whole and for the three 
sectors.
10  From the China Statistical Abstract (2006), we obtain constant price indices for 
“primary industry”, “secondary industry”, “tertiary industry” and construction.  These broad 
                                                 
8 While quality adjusted volume measures are available for most primary products and manufactures there is 
generally no comparable quality-adjusted measure of services volume and hence no accurate index of service prices.  
The same point can be made about the capital stock – in most countries it is increasingly computation-intensive, yet 
the price of computation services has declined relative to those of other capital goods.  Standard estimates of capital 
stocks tend therefore to be underestimates. 
9 The “Agriculture” sector is defined as Primary Industry plus Food processing, “Industry” as Secondary Industry 
minus Construction and Food processing, while “Services” as Tertiary Industry plus Construction. 
10 Output data are from the China Statistical Year Book (2005), China Industrial Economic Statistical Year Book 
(every year after 1985) and China Statistical Abstract (2006). Employment data are from China Statistical Year Book 
(2005), China Industrial Economic Statistical Year Book (every year after 1985) and China Labor Statistical Year 
Book (every year after 1985).  China’s capital stock, at 2000 prices, is from Holtz (2006). 
  6sectors are not precise fits to the sectors we define so we construct deflators from constant and 
current price industry output indices.  We then use these to restructure the price and output 
quantity statistics by sector.  This gives us output series in constant 2000 prices for “agriculture”, 
“industry” and “services”.
11  For the period as a whole relative service price inflation is somewhat 
obscured by early rises in primary product prices.  The implied sectoral price indices are therefore 
plotted in Figure 2 from 1990 onward.  For the relatively stable fixed exchange rate period 
beyond 1995, service prices clearly inflated relative to those of traded merchandise. 
A particular difficulty in the case of China concerns statistics on labour use.  According to 
Cai and Wang (2006), China’s officially published urban employment data may be 
underestimated due to the omission of workers present in urban areas “unofficially”, without 
urban registration.  They estimate the unrecorded “residual” in urban employment data at 11.3 per 
cent between 1991 and 1995, 23.8% in 1996-2000 and 38.4% in 2001-2004.  We therefore 
enlarge employment in industry and services from 1991 to 2005 based on the proportions 
estimated by Cai and Wang. 
In order to estimate the Solow residual separately for each of the three sectors, the capital 
stock, the total for which is drawn from the recent work of Holtz (2006), must be split between 
them.  To do this we assume rates of return on physical capital do not differ greatly between 
sectors and hence that the sectoral distribution of physical capital use is the same as that of 
expenditure on capital.  For the latter, we use the sectoral splits of “operating surplus” in China’s 
input-output tables for 1992, 1995, 1997, 2000, and 2002.
12  Finally, we need estimates for the 
capital share of value added, α .  Again, we use the input-output tables.  Ignoring “net taxes on 
production” and “total depreciation of fixed assets”, we take total value added as the sum of 
“operating surplus” and “compensation of labour”.  The capital share is then the share of 
operating surplus in this total.
13
  The average annual per cent changes in the Solow residuals for each sector are given in 
Table 1.  These show strong productivity performance by the Chinese economy since the mid-
1980s, with a slowdown in the 1998-2001 period associated with the Asian financial crisis and 
                                                 
11 The availability of constant and current price statistics notwithstanding, for reasons indicated previously, we are 
not sanguine about the accuracy of the resulting price series, and particularly that for services. 
12 Operating surplus is   where r ii rK i is the return rate to capital in sector i and aggregate compensation to capital is 
ii rK rK =∑ , wherer and  K  are the aggregate capital return rate and the physical capital stock.  We assume that 
i rr =  for all i, making it possible add the operating surpluses and allocate them sectorally (‘agriculture’ needs to be 
split between the value-added shares of Food Processing and Food Manufacturing).  Then, for each of the three 
sectors, the share of capital stock is given by:  ii ii rK rK ∑ . 
13 Our estimates of α  are smallest for the “agriculture” sector and largest for the “industry” sector.  There is an 
important trend, however, for industry to become less capital intensive and both “agriculture” and “services” to 
become more capital intensive. 
  7the post-millennium stock market corrections.
14  Consistent with the analysis of Lu (2006a), 
productivity growth appears to have been strongest in the industrial sector and strong relative to 
the US.
15  The averages disguise higher recent productivity growth in the agriculture sector, 
however, as rural to urban migration accelerates.
16  Importantly, the growth rate of productivity in 
services is always slower than in the tradable sectors.  Yet, particularly in recent years, the 
differences are not large.  While this offers support to the BSH, the gap has been clearly 
insufficient to overcome long run depreciating forces that are not accounted for in its 
assumptions.  A generalisation is required. 
 
4  Generalising Balassa-Samuelson 
The keys to generalising the BSH lie in its underlying assumptions.  We offer a critique of 
each and then discuss the key implications of the most important failures. 
 
Only tradable productivity grows, and faster in the focus economy 
  During some periods and in some developing countries, productivity growth has been 
observed to be higher in the non-tradable sector,
17 leading to  ˆˆ N
i
N A A >  and tending to depreciate 
the real exchange rate.  Modern transport, financial, health and education services offer 
considerable potential for productivity catch-up.  Whatever the relative performance of China’s 
services sector in the past, recent evidence suggests substantial potential for catch-up and 
accelerated productivity growth in the future (Ma 2006). 
 
The law of one price for tradable goods 
  Failures of the law of one price have been observed for tradable goods in specific 
instances.
18  That it fails particularly in the trade between China and the US is clear from the 
analysis by Amiti and Freund (2007).  Goods and services are not homogeneous across countries 
                                                 
14 The productivity performance in this period appears to have remained strong in the industrial sector while 
deteriorating in agriculture and services.  This may be caused by the financial crisis, its associated economic slow-
down and the retreat of unrecorded workers from industry to agriculture and services. 
15 For a summary of corresponding US productivity performance, see Gordon (2006). 
16 The omission of the skill content of the labour force probably contributes to some overestimation of Solow 
residuals.  This tendency is reinforced by changes in the composition of the capital stock that cause its 
underestimation.. 
17  For example, the Cold War infrastructure investments in Korea and Taiwan reduced service costs at early stages 
in their periods of rapid expansion. 
18  See, for example, Engel (1993), Engel and Rogers (1996), Bergin et al. (2006); Crucini et al. (2005); and Drine 
and Rault (2005). 
  8but are differentiated at minimum by country of origin.
19  Supply and/or demand side factors that 
raise the volume of tradable production move the home country down the global demand curves 
for its product varieties, reducing its supply prices and resulting in deterioration in the terms of 
trade and a depreciation of its real exchange rate.  Factor endowment growth and changes in 
policy that lead to substitution away from home toward foreign products lower relative home 
product prices and depreciate real exchange rates. 
 
Labour arbitrage 
  In most developing economies, the marginal product of industrial labour exceeds that of 
rural labour due to the more rapid accumulation of industrial capital.  There is, therefore, a 
Harris-Todaro gulf between wages in the expanding and contracting sectors.  Yet the key 
Balassa-Samuelson assumption is that the same wage is paid in the traded and non-traded sectors, 
principally the manufacturing and the services sectors.  This assumption could fail if labour 
mobility between the rural and industrial sectors is inferior to that between the rural and service 
sectors (particularly construction).  Were this the case, industrial productivity growth would drive 
up the industrial wage but the services wage need not rise to the same extent and this would 
moderate relative service price increases and hence real appreciations.  Evidence for this 
difference in mobility is offered by Chang and Tyers (2003). 
 
Closed capital account 
  The assumption that the real exchange rate depends only on interactions among countries 
associated with trade in merchandise is clearly violated in many of today’s developing countries, 
and particularly in China.  Its violation, in concert with failures of the law of one price for traded 
goods, means that any influx of payments (in the form of a foreign direct investment or portfolio 
capital flow) raises aggregate demand.  Since traded goods are supplied more elastically via 
imports than are non-traded goods—which depend on home resources—such an influx must raise 
relative non-traded prices and therefore appreciate the real exchange rate.  Conversely, effluxes 
cause real depreciations. 
 
Key implications of failures 
  With failure of the law of one price for tradable goods, numerous growth shocks, other 
than productivity increases, become important determinants of the real exchange rate. 
                                                 
19  This is a standard assumption in the most widely used numerical models of open economies and global trade. See, 
for example, Dixon et al. (1982); McKibbin and Sachs (1991); Hertel (1997); and Dixon and Rimmer (2002). 
  9 
Labour endowment changes: 
  Shocks to the labour force, the supply of skilled workers and to the capital stock are 
considered here.  These act by altering domestic factor costs and hence producer prices.  Consider 
first changes in China’s labour force.  During the past two decades it has enjoyed a ‘demographic 
dividend’, stemming from the high proportion of working-aged people in the total population 
(Bloom and Williamson 1998).  This, according to Cai and Wang (2005), accounted for about 
one-quarter of per capita GDP growth between 1980 and 2003.  It is seen as having been 
important in keeping wages low, thereby enabling the rapid expansion of labour-intensive 
manufactured exports.  In future the ageing of the population and the consequent decline in the 
labour supply will have the opposite effect, boosting both wages and the overall dependency ratio 
and placing upward pressure on China’s unit costs and its real exchange rate.  Tyers and Golley 
(2008b) project China’s labour force to begin declining in about a decade, as illustrated in Figure 
3.  They also show that the dependency ratio, which is now still declining as youth dependency 
falls with China’s birth rate, will commence rising at about the same time.
20  Alternative 
population policies, such as the relaxation of the One Child Policy, clearly stand to affect 
economic growth via the labour supply, and therefore to impact on the real exchange rate as well. 
  Because largely non-traded services are comparatively skill-intensive, the endowment of 
skilled labour is also a key determinant.  The third row of Table 2 makes it clear that for China, as 
for most other economies, a change in the skilled wage has by far the largest effect on the 
services sector.  Fogel (2006) predicts that investment in human capital has the potential to serve 
as China’s key engine of economic growth for the next two decades, a point that is well 
recognised by China’s leaders (as emphasised in the eleventh Five-Year Plan).  He qualifies the 
impact of enhancing the quality of labour through education on the growth rate of per capita 
income and shows that increasing secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios have a sizeable impact 
on the growth of labour productivity and per capita GDP growth.
21  This foreshadows a 
potentially large effect of accelerated education and training on China’s real exchange rate. 
 
Capital endowment shocks and financial flows: 
                                                 
20 See Tyers and Golley, op cit: Figure 6. 
21 For example, he calculates that if the tertiary enrolment ratio rose from six to 25 in the next 20 years (putting 
China where the Western European nations were in 1980), the growth rate of labour productivity would rise by 4.4 
per cent between 2000 and 2020, and that this would account for more than 60 per cent of the per capita GDP growth 
target set in 2002.  With the tertiary ratio increasing from 12.5 per cent to 19 per cent between 2000 and 2004, if 
anything, his estimates could be too conservative. 
  10  Shocks to the capital stock tend to be associated with changes in net financial flows on the 
balance of payments.  These stem from the gap between saving and investment and, as Figure 4 
shows, this gap favours saving and has been enlarging since the financial crisis years of the late 
1990s.  Indeed, while China’s investment is, by international standards, large in relation to its 
GDP, its gross saving rate of over 50 per cent is truly extraordinary.  There are two separate 
underlying causes of this.  The first is that China’s investment interest premium, which measures 
the gap between the average interest rate at which investment is financed in China and the 
corresponding average rate abroad (say in the US), has been declining with continuing financial 
reform.  It remains high by developed country standards because a substantial proportion of 
China’s private investment is still financed through the informal sector at very high rates (Tyers 
and Golley 2008b).  Yet its decline expands China’s share of global funds for investment and 
thus the ratio of China’s investment to its GDP. 
  The second is that China’s private saving rate has been growing.  Private households save 
about a third of their disposable income (Azziz and Cui 2007).  This is high by international 
standards but not extraordinary for Asia.  It stems from intertemporal choices by private 
households that are driven by changes in the provision of health, education and retirement 
benefits as more of the population works in China’s expanding private sector.  The key to the 
very high proportion of GDP that is saved is an extraordinary level of corporate saving.  This 
derives in part from enormous profits made by some monopoly state owned enterprises (Lu et al. 
2007) and hence the infancy of China’s competition policy.  Even though these firms pay 
dividends to minority private share-holders, there is no return to the government as majority 
owner, causing too-heavy taxation of private households.  Moreover, in recent years at least, 
these firms have appeared to dispose of these savings in ways that do not create new investment, 
at least not immediately.  The high saving rate is therefore structural and, as financial reforms 
continue and competition and tax policies are implemented more effectively it can be expected to 
decline.  In the meantime it has the consequence of creating a substantial and controversial 
current account surplus.  This net financial outflow reduces home aggregate demand and hence 
depreciates the real exchange rate.
22
 
Demand switching trade liberalisation: 
  Trade liberalisation switches demand away from home-produced goods and services 
toward imported varieties.  For a single region, the supply of goods and services from the much 
                                                 
22 See Tyers and Golley (2008a) for a decomposition of the change in China’s real exchange rate in the decade 1997-
2006, which shows the high saving rate to be the largest single contributor to the real depreciating trend. 
  11larger foreign market is more elastic than that of home varieties, constrained as they are by local 
factor supplies and technology.  The effect of the demand switch toward foreign varieties, then, is 
to reduce the relative prices of home varieties and hence to depreciate the real exchange rate. 
 
The roles of monetary policy and the nominal exchange rate regime: 
  While it is beyond the scope of this paper to address associated monetary policy issues, it 
is commonly argued that the failure of China’s real exchange rate to appreciate significantly has 
been due to a pegged or bounded nominal exchange rate, secured by an extraordinary rate of 
accumulation of official foreign reserves.  We do not take this view.  China’s current account 
surplus stems from its high saving rate.  The associated net financial outflows take the form of 
reserve accumulation because capital controls are maintained, with the objective of avoiding a 
future financial crisis while China’s domestic financial sector remains immature, and most 
private households are therefore not permitted to hold foreign assets (Ma and McCauley 2007).  
The reserves are, in effect, foreign assets held by China’s central bank on behalf of its private 
households, who would otherwise acquire the assets themselves.
23  In what follows we focus on 
the microeconomic determinants of the underlying real exchange rate.  Once changes in it are 
thus determined, from Equation (1) it is clear that monetary and exchange rate policy represent 
the central bank’s choice between accommodating price level or nominal exchange rate changes. 
 
5  Modelling Real Exchange Rate Dynamics 
  Here we examine quantitatively the relationship between shocks associated with China’s 
economic growth and its real exchange rate.  For this purpose a numerical model is required that 
is global in scope and that incorporates the generalisations of the BSH assumptions discussed 
above.  Recall that these included productivity growth in non-tradable as well as tradable sectors, 
departures from the law of one price for tradable goods, a more sophisticated representation of 
the labour market and an open capital account.  With these generalisations, almost all shocks to 
the economy have implications for the real exchange rate. 
  We use a model that offers these generalisations.  Adapted from Tyers and Shi (2007a, 
2007b), it is a multi-region, multi-product dynamic simulation model of the world economy.
24  In 
the version used, the world is subdivided into 14 regions (Table 3).  Industries are aggregated into 
three sectors: agriculture (including processed foods), industry (mining and manufacturing) and 
                                                 
23 For an in-depth discussion of the debate over China’s monetary policy and exchange rate regime, see Tyers and 
Bain (2007), Xiao (2006) and Woo and Xiao (2007). 
24 The model has its origins in GTAP-Dynamic, the standard version of which is a derivative of its comparative static 
progenitor, GTAP (Hertel 1997).  Its dynamics are described in Ianchovichina and McDougall (2000). 
  12services (including construction)—the latter being little traded in comparison with the other two.  
Failures of the law of one price are represented by product differentiation, so that consumers 
substitute imperfectly between products from different regions.  As in other dynamic models of 
the global economy, the principal endogenous source of simulated economic growth is physical 
capital accumulation.  Technical change is introduced in the form of exogenous productivity 
growth that is sector and factor specific, allowing the analysis of productivity performance that 
differs between tradable and non-tradable sectors.  Consistent with the results indicated in Table 
1 for China, baseline productivity in the agriculture sectors of most regions grows more rapidly 
than that in services.  This allows continued shedding of labour by agriculture as part of the 
development process.
25
  Regional capital accounts are open and investors have adaptive expectations about real 
regional net rates of return on installed capital.  In each region, the level of investment is 
determined by a comparison of expected net rates of return on domestic installed capital with 
borrowing rates yielded by a global trust, to which each region’s saving contributes, adjusted by 
calibrated region-specific interest premiums.  Lagged adjustment processes ensure that financial 
capital is not fully mobile internationally in the short term, but that the paths of domestic and 
global interest rates become parallel, separated only by exogenous premiums in the long term.  
General financial reform is represented by a diminution of the interest premium and this tends to 
raise China’s share of global funds for investment through time.
26  The saving rate is high 
initially, so the baseline simulation maintains a diminishing current account surplus. 
  To characterise changes in labour supply and quality, it encompasses both demographic 
and economic behaviour.  It tracks populations in four age groups, two genders and two skill 
categories: a total of 16 population groups in each of the 14 regions.  The skill subdivision is 
between production labour (unskilled) and professional labour (skilled).
27  Each age–gender–skill 
group is represented as a homogeneous sub-population with a group-specific birth and death rate, 
labour force participation rate and rates of immigration and emigration.  Because the non-traded 
sector is relatively intensive in skill, trends in skill composition prove to be particularly 
important.  These depend on the rate at which each region’s education and social development 
                                                 
25 In the case of China, Wang and Ding (2006) recently estimated that there were 40 million surplus workers in 
China’s agricultural sector.  While underemployment is not explicit in our model, the assumption of high labour 
productivity growth in agriculture implies that agriculture is capable of shedding labour without consequence for its 
output as workers are drawn away by urban capital accumulation. 
26 For further details on the implementation and calibration of the investment interest premium, see Tyers and Golley 
(2008b). 
27 The subdivision between production workers and professionals and para-professionals accords with the 
International Labour Organisation’s occupation-based classification and is consistent with the labour division 
adopted in the GTAP Database. See Liu et al. (1998). 
  13institutions transform unskilled (production-worker) families into skilled (professional-worker) 
families.  Each year a particular proportion of the population in each production-worker age–
gender group is transferred to professional status.  The initial values of these proportions depend 
on the regions’ levels of development, the associated capacities of their education systems and 
the relative sizes of their production and professional labour forces.  Rates of transformation 
change through time in response to corresponding changes in real per capita income and the 
skilled wage premium.
28  This skill accumulation process offers the second of the two 
endogenous sources of growth in all regional economies. 
  These demographic details help to generalise the model’s characterisation of labour 
supply and quality in each region.  A related BSH generalisation that could prove important is the 
difference in labour mobility between the rural and industrial sectors on the one hand and the 
rural and service sectors on the other.  In the absence of reliable estimates of the relevant 
elasticities of labour substitution, however, this behaviour is omitted from the model.  While skill 
compositions of labour demand differ between sectors according to empirical evidence, unskilled 
labour is assumed to be homogeneous across sectors and its wage to be the same throughout the 
economy. 
  The 16 age–gender–skill groups differ in their shares of regional disposable income, 
consumption preferences, saving rates and labour force participation behaviour.  While the 
consumption–savings choice differs for each group, it is dependent for all on group-specific real 
per capita disposable income and the regional real lending rate.  Governments are assumed to 
balance their budgets while saving and borrowing are undertaken by the private sector.  The 
baseline scenario is a ‘business-as-usual’ projection of the global economy to 2030. 
 
6  Growth Shocks and China’s Real Exchange Rate 
  Our focus is on how shocks that enhance the rate of GDP growth impact on the real 
exchange rate.  Given the country aggregation adopted for the model, our interest is in the 
bilateral rate between China (including Hong Kong and Taiwan) and North America (including 
Canada and Mexico), since this best parallels China’s nominal exchange rate policy and the RMB 
valuation debate.  It is measured as in Equation (1), except that, since we use a real model, the 
regional GDP prices are expressed relative to a common global numeraire and so no currency 
conversion is necessary.  The determinants of growth performance that are investigated are once-
                                                 
28 China’s skill share is projected to rise through time while that in its real exchange rate comparator, North America, 
remains static.  The contrast is due to North America’s higher initial skill share, its high rate of unskilled immigration 
and its higher fertility rate. 
  14and-for-all increases in sectoral productivity growth rates, increases in China’s skill 
transformation rate, birth rate increases, interest premium decreases (which raise investment and 
reduce net financial outflows), average saving rate increases (which yield more self-financing of 
investment and more net financial outflows) and tariff decreases (increases in openness or in the 
import penetration ratio).  In each case, we run a new simulation in which the determinant in 
question is shocked once and for all, as of 2005.  We then extract the elasticity of China’s real 
exchange rate to each shock, tracking the values through time to 2030. 
  Productivity growth is considered at the outset, followed by shocks to endowment levels: 
the skill acquisition rate, the birth rate and the investment interest premium.  Finally, demand 
switching shocks are considered.  These are to the average saving rate and the level of openness 
on the current account as it is determined by trade policy.  In each case we make a new 
simulation in which the growth determinant in question is shocked once-and-for-all, as of 2005.  
An elasticity of the real exchange rate to that determinant is then constructed, the value of which 
is tracked through time to 2030. 
 
Faster productivity growth 
  To match our empirical analysis of sectoral productivity in China, we shock total factor 
productivity separately in each sector.  The overall rate of economic growth proves to be quite 
sensitive to such productivity shocks since the larger these are for a particular region, the larger is 
that region’s marginal product of capital.  The region therefore enjoys higher levels of investment 
and hence a double boost to its growth rate.  In each case the real exchange rate elasticity is 
measured as the percentage departure of the projected real exchange rate for each percentage per 
annum increase in total factor productivity.  The resulting elasticities are indicated in Figure 5. 
  First, consider the effects of higher productivity growth in both tradables sectors.  This is 
shown to yield the expected real appreciations but “industry” is by far the most open and 
therefore the most significant for the real exchange rate.
29  The appreciating effects of tradable 
productivity increases are consistent with the BSH and the simulation results show that they are, 
as expected, due to wage growth and relative service price inflation.  They are bolstered in the 
short term by increased investment and hence greater net inflows on the capital account.  In the 
long term the enlargement of China’s industrial capital stock reduces its capital costs and hence 
tends to abate the real appreciating effects.  Next, the corresponding shock is applied to the 
services sector.  Also, as expected from the dominance of non-traded sector prices in Equation 
                                                 
29 The elasticity to agricultural productivity is not shown in the figure because its effects on the real exchange rate are 
small by comparison with industrial productity. 
  15(2), faster service productivity growth depreciates the real exchange rate, modestly in the early 
years but to a dominant extent in the long term when it is reinforced by associated capital 
accumulation. 
  If productivity is boosted equi-proportionally in all sectors, the net effect is a small real 
appreciation in the short run and a substantial real depreciation in the long run.  There is no net 
BSH effect and hence no relative service price inflation.  Instead, the short run net appreciation 
stems from an associated rise in capital returns and hence from the attraction of increased 
investment from abroad.  Beyond a decade, as costs are reduced by the across-the-board rise in 
productivity, combined with the associated capital expansion, the elasticity turns negative and 
very quickly expands in that direction.  The particular strength of changes in service productivity 
is notable, suggesting that the forecasting of real exchange rates depends importantly on this 
difficult-to-measure behaviour.  Indeed, if our productivity estimates in Table 1 are correct, the 
difference between China’s productivity performance in tradables and services is not large.  This 
suggests that a catch-up in China’s services productivity, the potential of which is suggested by 
Ma (2006), could come to dominate the effects on the real exchange rate, causing a depreciating 
trend. 
 
Higher skill acquisition rate 
  As already discussed, one of the endogenous sources of growth in our model is human 
capital accumulation, or skill acquisition.  The proportion of each region’s production worker 
family members are transformed in to professional family members in each age-gender group in 
each year is the skill acquisition rate.  As modelled, it depends on such things as the regional 
skilled wage premium.  Here the equation determining this rate is shifted so as to raise it for any 
given skilled wage premium.  In developing regions like China, where the production worker 
population is larger than its professional counterpart, the resulting proportional boost to the skill 
supply is larger than the proportional loss of production workers.  GDP increases and, other 
things equal, there is a real depreciation.  This tendency is exaggerated by the fact that the 
services sector is comparatively intensive in skill, so that the shock causes a relatively large boost 
to service output and hence a comparatively large fall in the service price.  The elasticity, shown 
in Figure 5, is the per cent departure of the real exchange rate for each per cent of the population 
in production worker families that is transformed each year.  As the figure shows, defined this 
way, skill transformation places downward pressure on the real exchange rate of magnitude 
similar to total factor productivity in services, at least in the long run. 
 
  16Higher birth rate 
  The birth rate affects the real exchange rate by raising the population (initially) and the 
labour force (subsequently).  The initial effect is to raise aggregate demand but not to contribute 
to supply since new births necessitate the redistribution of income to the non-saving and non-
working young population.  Net inflows on the capital account rise and the real exchange rate 
appreciates.  In the long run, when the increased birth rate yields a larger workforce, the supply 
effects predominate.  Wage costs are lower and the real exchange rate declines.  Surprisingly, the 
elasticity to the birth rate, shown in Figure 6, is comparatively small in magnitude, at least during 
the first two decades.  Once again, it is calculated by imposing a once-and-for-all shock to the 
birth rate and dividing the percentage change in the real exchange rate by the percentage point 
increase in the birth rate.
30
 
Investment interest premium decline 
  Consider first the effects of a decline in China’s investment interest premium.  In the short 
term, it raises investment, reducing net financial outflows on the balance of payments.  This 
raises aggregate demand and appreciates the real exchange rate.  It is evident in the early years of 
the path of the elasticity in Figure 5, which is measured as the ratio of the percentage change in 
the real exchange rate and the resulting percentage point decrease in the home interest rate.  We 
define as positive the decline in the interest premium (because such declines are associated 
positively with GDP growth).  In the long term, when the effect of investment on the capital stock 
is realised, the supply side dominates.  More abundant and hence cheaper capital reduces 
production costs.  And because both industry services are capital intensive (Table 2), the prices of 
China’s manufactured exports and non-traded services are reduced, unambiguously yielding a 
real depreciation.  The elasticity to the premium decline is large and positive in the short term, 
with a lag to the switch in sign of about a decade. 
 
Saving rate increase 
  This is generated in the model by shifting the consumption equations for Chinese age-
gender-skill groups so as to simultaneously raise their saving rates.
31  The elasticity of the real 
                                                 
30 The birth rate is defined on the female population aged 15-29.  Were it defined as births over total population a one 
percentage point shock would have a larger effect and yield a larger elasticity.  We use this definition because it is 
directly proportional to the fertility rate. 
31 In each region the model has 16 age-gender-skill groups each of which has endogenous saving, driven by real 
disposable income and the real interest rate.  Each group consumption equation has a region-wide shifter that can be 
modified to accord with observed total savings changes or shocked by a small proportion to derive an elasticity of 
sensitivity. 
  17exchange rate to the average saving rate is defined as the percentage change in the real exchange 
rate for each percentage point rise in the proportion of disposable income saved.  An increased 
saving rate, other things equal, causes a larger current account surplus, a fall in home 
consumption and therefore in home aggregate demand, and hence a real depreciation.  And so, 
controlling for investment, a negative elasticity is expected.  Yet there are two other factors that 
enter the story.  First, and least important, investment is directly affected by the saving rate.  As 
modelled, an empirically based proportion of saving in every region is turned directly to domestic 
investment without becoming available to the global capital market.  A higher saving rate 
therefore also implies that domestic investment should also rise, albeit by a smaller proportion.  
This makes the net effect of higher savings on financial outflows smaller and hence it boosts the 
current account surplus by less, and so it might be expected to yield a smaller negative elasticity. 
  The second factor is that the current account surplus builds up foreign assets which then 
pay returns that take the form of inflows on the current account.  In the short run this effect is 
small, but the change in foreign asset stock due to a once and for all increase in saving 
accumulates through time.  Eventually, the flow of returns more than offsets the tendency for 
increased saving to raise the current account surplus.  The path through time of the simulated 
elasticity is shown in Figure 6.  The negative effect of increased saving persists for almost two 
decades, after which returns from new assets held abroad are sufficient to reverse its sign of the 
elasticity. 
  At all lengths of run the saving elasticity has smaller magnitude than that of the interest 
premium.  This is not to imply that the saving rate is a less important determinant of the real 
exchange rate, however.  As Figure 4 shows, China’s gross saving rate has risen by 14 percentage 
points since the late 1990s.  The corresponding change in the investment interest premium has 
been estimated to have been only a fraction of a percentage point.
32  During the last decade, the 
net effect on China’s real exchange rate of changes to the interest premium and the saving rate 




 Trade  liberalisation  increases a region’s openness, as measured by the import penetration 
ratio.  The elasticity of China’s real exchange rate to its openness to trade is constructed by 
dividing the percentage change in the real exchange rate by the percentage point change in the 
                                                 
32 See Tyers and Golley (2008b). 
  18overall import penetration ratio (the ratio of the value of imports to the total value of domestic 
consumption).  The shock on which it is based is a phased removal of all China’s merchandise 
trade barriers over five years.
33  The elasticity, shown in Figure 5, proves to be quite large, with 
the expected negative sign, and it grows in magnitude through time. 
  The rise in the elasticity’s (negative) magnitude through time occurs because, even though 
the industries most affected by trade liberalisation are capital intensive (Table 2), the broad group 
“industry” in the model is benefited overall, raising the return on physical capital and attracting 
additional investment.  This apparent anomaly occurs because the “industry” aggregate produces 
goods that are differentiated from competing imports with the degree of differentiation limiting 
the extent of demand switching.  At the same time this industry group is a large importer of 
intermediate inputs that are also industrial products.  It turns out that the gains to the sector from 
cheaper intermediates outweigh the losses from import competition in final demand.
34  The 
effects on GDP are positive, with the raised investment and capital growth tending to reduce costs 
further and hence to enlarge the negative elasticity through time. 
 
Sensitivity of real exchange rate elasticities to the size of growth shocks 
  For most growth shocks the non-linearity of the behaviour embodied in the model is not 
sufficient to make the elasticities shown in Figures 5 and 6 very sensitive to the scale of the 
shock.  The one important exception is the decline in the investment interest premium.  The short 
run (one year) effects of this shock on the real exchange rate are very sensitive to its size.  The 
long run effects (25 years), on the other hand, are no more sensitive than the other growth 
determinants.  This comparative short run sensitivity is illustrated in Figure 7, which shows that 
the short run elasticity is very large for a large negative shock to the interest premium, and 
asymptotically approaches zero the less negative or the more positive is the shock. 
  This occurs because a large negative shock in China’s interest premium causes a flood of 
investment into China, resulting in a large boost to aggregate demand, rises in Chinese relative to 
foreign product and service prices and hence a short run real appreciation.  Because we define the 
interest premium decline as positive (it has a positive effect on GDP growth), the short run 
elasticity that emerges is also positive.  A rise in the interest premium (a negative shock), on the 
other hand, stifles investment, contracts aggregate demand and Chinese prices and hence causes a 
real depreciation.  This behaviour still yields a positive elasticity but it is smaller the larger is the 
                                                 
33 The elasticity is insensitive to the scale of the liberalisation though not to the composition of China’s protection.  
For the levels of protection embodied in the database for 1997 see Dimaranan and McDougall (2002). 
34 This effect is discussed in detail in Rees and Tyers (2004). 
  19magnitude of the shock.  Its diminution is because annual investment expenditure is bounded 
from below by zero.  The short run elasticity for a positive shock is increasing in the size of the 
shock because the larger its size the larger is new investment as a proportion of GDP and the 
larger, then, is the proportional aggregate demand boost and the associated real appreciation.
35
 
The principal determinants of the real exchange rate in the short and long run 
  Those growth shocks that have the largest real exchange rate elasticities are collected 
together in Figure 5.  The general pattern in this figure is that growth shocks tend to cause real 
appreciations in the short run, due primarily to the aggregate demand boost associated with 
financial capital influx, and real depreciations in the long run, the scale of which depends 
critically on the performance of the services sector.  BSH forces are possible contributors in the 
medium term but the figure shows that they can readily be swamped by financial capital influx in 
the short run and by a combination of increased openness, human capital growth and services 
productivity in the long run. 
  That said elasticities to growth shocks are not always the best measure of potential 
impact.  Outcomes also depend on the magnitudes of the shocks themselves.  It is clear from the 
discussion of investment interest premium and saving rate shocks that the smaller elasticity to 
saving rate changes belies their significance for the real exchange rate because those changes 
have in fact been comparatively large in magnitude.  The same is true of the productivity 
elasticities.  Actual shocks to Chinese productivity have, thus far, been largest in the industrial 
sector.  Even though the elasticity of the real exchange rate to industrial productivity is smaller 
than to service productivity, we do not preclude the possibility that China’s productivity growth 
alone has thus far supplied an appreciating force consistent with the conclusion of Lu (2006b). 
 
7  Conclusion 
  The magnitudes of the various links between the shocks that are instrumental in China’s 
growth performance and its real exchange rate are quantified.  Because of the key role of 
technical change, China’s productivity performance since the 1980s is first reviewed and then 
analysed numerically.  The results confirm very strong productivity growth, concentrated 
throughout the period in industrial sectors, with some acceleration late in the period in 
agricultural productivity, driven mainly by rural to urban migration.  Significantly, productivity 
                                                 
35 The corresponding long run effect is for the larger rise in the capital stock to reduce capital costs and hence 
(particularly) service prices.  The size of the elasticity diminishes with the scale of the shock in this case because 
costs, and therefore home prices, are bounded from below by zero. 
  20in the largely non-traded service sector is measured as having been slower than in the tradeable 
sectors.  While the measured difference in productivity growth rates is not large it does leave 
scope for BSH real appreciation effects and the associated relative inflation of service prices is 
observed since the mid 1990s.  A generalisation of the BSH is clearly required since there has 
been no associated tendency for China’s real exchange rate to appreciate. 
  Such a generalisation is offered, emphasising widely observed failures of the law of one 
price.  Once these are recognised almost all shocks contributing to China’s growth also affect its 
real exchange rate and many tend to depreciate it, potentially explaining the failure to observe an 
appreciating trend since the 1990s.  To examine the effects of the full variety of growth-related 
shocks on the real exchange rate, we turn to a dynamic model of the global economy with 
endogenous growth driven by both physical and human capital accumulation, open capital 
accounts and labour supply behaviour fully underpinned by demographics.  A baseline “business 
as usual” simulation is constructed to 2030 and comparator simulations are then made for cases in 
which sectoral factor productivity is higher, the skill acquisition rate is faster, financial reform 
reduces China’s interest premium, the average saving rate rises and, trade reforms continue to 
open the economy.  The effects of changes in fertility policy are also examined, along with 
demand shifting changes in trade policy.  China’s real exchange rate realignments are examined 
in each case. 
  The results suggest that, while population policy affects the real exchange rate in the 
directions expected, demographic change has only a weak influence, at least within the three 
decades examined.  In the short run the key determinant is the change in net financial capital 
flows associated either with the effects of financial reform on the interest premium or a change in 
the saving rate.  If the premium continues to fall and the currently high saving rate moderates, 
this will emerge as a strong appreciating force.  This would reverse the experience of the past 
decade, during which China’s saving rate has increased, widening its current account surplus and 
turning this substantial force toward real depreciation. 
  In the medium term, scope does emerge for BSH real appreciation, if services 
productivity lags sufficiently behind industrial productivity.  In the long run, because services are 
skill-intensive on average, their performance is bolstered by both productivity improvements and 
human capital growth.  And the sensitivity of the real exchange rate to these effects is so large as 
to make them potentially dominant.  Since Chinese industrial productivity growth has been higher 
than that of its trading partners for more than a decade considerable scope remains for 
productivity catch-up in services.  Indeed, it is possible that services productivity could become 
the dominant source of future growth in China.  This, combined with the massive investments 
  21being made by the Chinese government and Chinese families in human capital accumulation 
foreshadows powerful depreciating forces on the real exchange rate. 
  Thus, the future path of China’s real exchange rate depends on the relative magnitudes of 
the effects considered here.  The opening of the Chinese economy since 2000 has integrated its 
financial and product markets with those abroad to an increasing extent.  Foreign investment has 
boomed in its tradable goods sectors and its temporary appreciating effect might have been 
expected to appreciate its real exchange rate.  Yet a high and, at least over the decade 1997-2006, 
rising saving rate, combined with trade policy reforms, appears to have more than offset these 
appreciating forces.  In the coming decades the saving rate is likely to fall and there are few 
further trade policy reforms to implement.  The future direction of China’s real exchange rate will 
then depend on the interplay all the forces discussed here and there is certainly no guarantee that 
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a  These are indices of nominal bilateral rates deflated according to  /
US
R YY eE P P =⋅ , where E is the nominal 
exchange rate in US$ per unit of local currency,  Y P  is the local GDP price and 
US
Y P  is the corresponding US GDP 
price. 
Sources: International Financial Statistics (www.IMF.org) and national statistical authorities. 
 
 

















a These are sectoral price indices for ‘Primary industry’, which is mainly agriculture; ‘secondary industry’, which is 
primarily manufacturing and construction; and ‘tertiary industry’, which is other services. 
Source: The price indices are implied by volume and value data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China 
(2007). 
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a  Millions of full time equivalent workers.  
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a Since errors and omissions are large, we have adjusted the least accurately measured items in each sub-account 
(usually net factor income and net private flows on the financial account) to ensure balance. 
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2007a. International Financial Statistics, April, International Monetary 
Fund, Washington, DC. International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2007b. World Economic Outlook Database, April, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. Some 2006 figures are derived from data from the Chinese National 
Bureau of Statistics, 2007. Economist Intelligence Unit, Chinese National Bureau of Statistics.  
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Figure 5: Elasticities of the Projected Real Exchange Rate to the Principal 












2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Industry TFP growth increase
Services TFP growth increase
Skill transformation rate increase
Interest premium decline
Trade reform - penetration ratio increase
 
a The elasticities of the real exchange rate to each determinant are defined as the % change in the real exchange rate 
due to the following once and for all changes as of 2005: 
Industry and services TFP: % point change in the annual growth rate of total factor productivity, 
Skill acquisition rate: % point change in the proportion of the low-skill labour force that is transformed to high skill 
in each year, 
Interest premium decline: % point decline in the home interest rate due to premium decline, 
Trade liberalisation: % decline in the import penetration ratio, M/C, which changes year to year but which is due to 
the graduated liberalisation of all trade distortions remaining after WTO accession reforms over 2005-2010. 
Source: Simulations using the model described in the text. 
 


















a The elasticities of the real exchange rate to each determinant are defined as the % change in the real exchange rate 
due to the following once and for all changes as of 2005: 
Birth rate: % point change in new births as a share of the fertile population, 
Saving rate: % point change in the average (across age-gender-skill groups) proportion of disposable income set 
aside as saving. 
Source: Simulations using the model described in the text. 




Figure 7: Sensitivity of the Short and Long Run Elasticity of an Interest 
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a  % change in eR for a 1% decrease in the interest premium (elasticity of eR depends on scale of premium shock) 
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Table 1: Estimated Chinese Total Factor Productivity Growth by Sector 
% per year  Whole 
economy 
Agriculture Industry  Services 
1986-1989  3.5 1.4  3.8  3.8 
1990-1994  5.0 1.6  7.7  2.3 
1995-1997  5.7 5.5  3.7  3.2 
1998-2001  4.1 -0.2  8.9  -0.5 
2002-2005  6.0 5.4  6.3  4.6 
Source: Analysis of Chinese statistics described in the text.  Original sources are, for output, China 
Statistical Year Book (2005), China Industrial Economic Statistical Year Book (every year after 1985) and China 
Statistical Abstract (2006).  Employment data are from China Statistical Year Book (2005), China Industrial 
Economic Statistical Year Book (every year after 1985) and China Labor Statistical Year Book (every year after 
1985).  China’s capital stock, in 2000 prices, is taken from Holtz (2006).  Sectoral price indices are from China 




Table 2: Factor Shares of Chinese Sectoral Value Added 
per cent  Agriculture
a Industry
b Services 
Land 24  0  0 
Low-skill labour  54  47  34 
High-skill labour
c 2 8 22 
Capital 20  45  43 
Total 100  100  100 
a Agriculture, fisheries and forestry products and processed foods. 
b Manufacturing, mining and energy. 
c The first three of the ten ISCO occupational categories, comprising mainly professionals and para-professionals. 
Source: GTAP 5 Global Database, Dimaranan and McDougall (2002). 
 
 
Table 3: Regional Composition in the Global Model 
Region  Composition of aggregates 
Australia  
North America  Canada, Mexico, United States 
Western Europe  European Union, including Switzerland and Scandinavia but excluding 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
Central Europe and the former Soviet 
Union 
Central Europe includes the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
Japan  
China  Includes Hong Kong and Taiwan 
Indonesia  
Other East Asia  Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
Vietnam 
India  
Other South Asia  Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
South America  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, 
Uruguay 
Middle East and Nth Africa  Includes Morocco through the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Sub-Saharan Africa  The rest of Africa 
Rest of World  Includes the rest of Central America, the rest of Indochina, the small 
Island states of the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans and the 
Mediterranean Sea, Myanmar and Mongolia, New Zealand and the 
former Yugoslavia 
Source: The GTAP 5 Global Database, Dimaranan and McDougall (2002).. 
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